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Abstract
I study a model of geopolitical organization endogenizing the size of nations, of their public
spending and of their degree of openness. The optimal geography may not be a stable
equilibrium and the Alesina-Spolaore bias toward too many nations tends to be confirmed.
However, multiple equilibria can emerge with globalization backlash associated with large
nations and high protectionism and equilibria with smaller countries and high openness which
are also Pareto superior. A dynamic version of the model shows stable paths of decreasing
size of nations, increasing globalization and (at least initially) increasing public spending.
Such a process seems consistent with the historical experience, but it may converge toward a
steady state with excessive globalization, too many countries and typically too much
government spending.
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Three fundamental political and economic phenomena of the last century have
been the raise of public spending, the break up of nations in smaller states or
more decentralized countries and the increased integration of international mar-
kets. While the ﬁrst phenomenum has probably achieved its peak and may now
reverse, the processes of decentralization and globalization are still in their full
momentum. This paper tries to provide a partial but consistent explanation for
these phenomena, for their simultaneity and, possibly, for their future evolution.
My starting point is a model by Alesina and Spolaore (1997, AS hence on)
who have pioneered the study of the endogenous creation of borders between
nations. They emphasize a trade-oﬀ between heterogeneity in preferences and
scale economies in public good provision as determinant of the size of nations,
deriving the optimal size of nations. Despite this optimal solution can be a
stable equilibrium, AS emphasize a tendency toward political equilibria with
too many small nations.
While AS keep public spending per nation as an exogenous variable, this
paper starts by endogenizing the size of public spending of a nation and deriv-
ing the optimal size of nations and of their public spending abstracting from
issues of globalization. I ﬁnd that the optimal geography may not be a stable
equilibrium because it may imply too large countries from which citizens at the
borders would prefer to escape. More exactly, a stable equilibrium geography
implies sub-optimal size of nations and governments when public and private
consumption are close substitutes, while it may imply over-optimal size of na-
tions and governments when they are imperfect substitutes. This suggests that
the historical process of the XXth century toward smaller size nations may be
a consequence of the increased sustituibility between private and public goods,
where publicly provided private goods are closer substitutes with private goods
while pure public goods are less substitutable with private goods.
The next step is to bring into the picture the other crucial factor in the
secular decline of the size of nations, the increase in openness (Alesina, Spolaore
and Wacziarg, 2000). I introduce globalization, endogenize it and derive the
dynamic paths leading toward a steady state political equilibrium for the size of
nations and governments and the degree of globalization. The results are quite
surprising.
First I show that an increase in the degree of openness tends to reduce the
size of countries but also to increase the size of their public sector. Such a result
is consistent with the empirical evidence of Rodrik (1998), who ﬁnds a clear
correlation between openness and size of the public sector. Rodrik oﬀers an
explanation based on the greater need of open countries for a stabilizing role
of the public sector. My explanation however, supports the empirical results of
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) who show that the crucial channel which drives
the above correlation is the fact that more open countries are smaller and more
2homogeneous countries and hence they are more likely to agree on higher public
good provision.
Second I show the possibility of multiple equilibria: there can be equilibria
with globalization backlash associated with large nations and high protectionism
and equilibria with smaller countries and high openness which are also Pareto
superior.
Finally, I ﬁnd that there are stable paths of decreasing size of nations, in-
creasing globalization and (at least initially) increasing public spending which
lead toward a steady state. If private and public spending are close substi-
tutes, the steady state is characterized by excessive globalization and too many
countries while public spending is typically too much.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model abstract-
ing from the degree of globalization, derives the optimal organization of the
world in terms of number of nations and size of their governments and studies
equilibrium outcomes. It also contains a digression which applies our result to
an alternative interpretation of our model, that is the federal organization of a
country in districts (or regions, or states), and a discussion on the relationship
between the process of creation of nations and the one of creation of unions of
nations for policy coordination. Section 3 introduces globalization and studies
a simple dynamic version of the model to suggest an historical interpretation of
the evolution of size of nations, size of governments and globalization. Section
4 concludes.
2 The Model
The analysis is based on a spatial model a’ la Hotelling (1929). The map of the
world is unidimensional and composed by a continuum of agents distributed on
the uniform interval [0,1]. In the world there are many countries each one with
a capital set in the middle of the country (since this is both optimal and an
equilibrium outcome). In the capital it is provided a public good whose size is
endogenous.1
Each citizen chooses how much to work, pays taxes in its own country and
enjoys the beneﬁts from public spending according to his or her distance from
the public good. Utility for agent i in country j has the following functional
form:
Uij = u[hij(1 − tj)] − v(hij)+H (gj)(λ − alij)( 1 )
where u(·) is utility from consumption which is income net of taxation at the
rate tj, and I assume unitary wage, while v(·) is the utility cost of working
hij hours. Finally H(·) is the utility from public spending gj in country j (I
1For related models on break-up of countries see also Buchanan and Faith (1987), Bolton
and Roland (1997), Bordignon and Brusco (2001), Haimanko et al. (2001) and Gradstein
(2002b).
3will use the less proper expression “public good” interchangeably). Many of the
following results will hold with this general model, but to obtain closed form
solutions, I will focus on linear utility from consumption, quadratic cost of work











where the parameter θ ∈ [0,1) governs the curvature of the utility from public
expenditure and represents the elasticity of marginal utility of public expendi-
ture (the lower it is, the more substitute are public and private consumption),
lij is distance from the public good and tj are taxes which imply a quadratic
distortion. The parameter a reﬂects the costs of heterogeneity: in particular we
assume that the costs of heterogeneity are linear in the distance from the public
good. Finally the parameter λ > 0 parametrizes the absolute utility provided
by the public good (for a citizen at distance zero from it).3 The tax independnt
output yj = y is assumed constant across countries in this section. Let us deﬁne
the size of country j as sj and the per capita provision of public goods as given




Our focus will be on these two variables.
Our interpretation of the utility function deserves some more comments. I
think of the sustituibility between private and public goods (summarized by the
parameter θ) in a very simple and, hopefully, intuitive way. If publicly provided
goods belong to a wide range which starts with purely private goods (drugs or
school’s books) and arrives to purely public goods (defense), the former typology
corresponds to goods with perfect sustituibility with the private goods and the
latter one with those that are less substitutable for the private goods.
Also the assumptions on the costs of heterogeneity which are linear in the
distance from the public good require a remark. First of all the same distance
must be interpreted latu sensu and not literally, however it is typically recog-
nized that regions far away from the capital of a country are the most likely to
have at least diﬀerent preferences from the regions close to the capital, and at
most a separatist tendency (the experience of many current and older European
2In particular I assume:
Uij = yj + hij(1 − tj) −








which implies the choice of working hours hij = tj and hence the indirect utility in the text.
3Notice that the model by Alesina and Spolaore (2003) is also diﬀerent because their costs
of heterogeneity are separate from the absolute utility derived from public spending. That
assumption would avoid any heterogenity in preferences for public spending, which is clearly
an essential element in our model.
4countries is quite clear in this direction). Such a correlation between geograph-
ical distance and preference distance is all what we need. Having said this, one
may think that the costs of distance from the location of public expenditure are
not necessarily linear in this distance. It is probably reasonable to suppose that
they are convex in it and I will discuss what such a change implies in Appendix
II.
2.1 Optimal Political Geography
Let us now examine the social planner solution, that is the optimal organization
of the world. It is easy to prove that, because of the uniform distribution of
citizens, a social planner would choose countries of equal size s and it would set
the public good at the centre of each country. Moreover, it would choose the














di s.v.: stj = gj



















If we apply the Alesina-Spolaore rule for the optimal size of nations as a
function of public good provision, that is we maximize welfare with respect to














The higher is the provision of the public good, the greater should be the
optimal size of nations so as to exploit properly the scale economies, while the
higher are heterogeneity costs, the smaller the countries should be. The second
implication has been tested by Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (2002): they show that
the number of school districts in a county in United States is higher in more
heterogeneous counties in terms of income distribution or racial fragmentation.4
Finally, the absolute utility from the public good does not aﬀect the optimal size
for a given amount of public good. Summarizing, the optimal size of nations is
an increasing and concave function of the provision of public goods.
This optimality condition gives us a ﬁrst relationship between optimal size










≡ ψ∗(s)( 5 )
4See also Strumpf and Oberholzer-Gee (2002).
5which is instead an increasing and convex function of s a ss h o w ni nF i g .1 .N o -
tice that this relationship suggests a positive correlation between size of coun-
tries and their public spending per capita. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) have
shown a robust empirical negative correlation between these two variables, hence
the simple AS model does not provide a consistent view of this phenomenum.
On the other side, a modiﬁed Samuelson rule for optimal public good provi-
sion (after Samuelson, 1955) gives us a function of the size of a country which




















which shows that the optimal provision of public goods is an inverted U function
o ft h es i z eo fan a t i o n . The latter can be rewritten as a second relationship












≡ φ∗(s)( 6 )
which is also shown in Fig. 1. As expected, this is decreasing in the costs of
heterogeneity a: less public spending and hence less taxation are better if the
costs of beneﬁting from these public spending are higher. More importantly,
the optimal per capita provision of public spending is ﬁrst increasing in the size






. The intuition is
simple. There is a trade oﬀ between heterogeneity costs and beneﬁts from scale
economies, and both increase in the size of a country. The net beneﬁt from pub-
lic goods provision is maximized at an intermediate size and the higher are the
costs of heterogeneity, the smaller are both the size at which maximum spend-
ing is achieved and the same maximum spending. Summarizing, the optimal
per capita provision of public goods is a non monotonic function of the size of
a nation: small and large countries should have lower taxes and countries of
intermediate size should have higher taxes.In the real world, the nature of this
non-monotonic relationship is also aﬀected by the nature of the public good. If
this is a pure public good, scale economies are quite relevant and the negative
relationship between taxes and size should be prevalent, but if the good has pri-
vate features - as in the case of schools and hospitals - scale economies may be
less important and the positive relationship should be prevalent. These impli-
cations can be empirically tested at the local level. A preliminary investigation
using data from Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) on counties in the United
States provides evidence of an inverted U-relationship between average spending
in local public goods and size of counties.5The full optimal solution is obtained
5Using data from Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), we obtained the following result
(t-statistics in parenthesis):
t =5 . 6 7+0 . 1 6log(y)+0 . 4 0 s -0 . 0 0 0 7 s2 -1 . 1 8 a +0 . 0 9 v
(1.54) (0.41) (5.0) (-4.09) (-2.7) (3.0)
6by solving the system of the two equations. To make the problem interesting,
from now on we will assume a ≥ 4λ which will guarantee the optimality of at








Figure 1. Optimal Geography
Solving the system of optimality conditions we obtain:
R2 =0 .183
where t is the local taxation rate (in percentage points), y is average per capita income, s
is population density, a is an index of racial fragmentation, v an index of violence and other
control variables are not reported. I have chosen density as a measure for the size of districts
because it better describes scale economies than total population. Scale economies not only
increase in the number of people beneﬁting from the public good but also decrease in the
necessary ﬁxed costs which are typically related to the dimension of the district (think of
roads or multiple schools or hospitals which are necessary when the districts are very wide).
Hence density population is the best indicator of the size of districts in the spirit of our
model. An inverted U relationship between population density and local tax rates is clear
and signiﬁcant. Notice that district’s population enter insigniﬁcantly in this regression, once
we control for density. Finally it is clear that heterogeneity negatively aﬀects local average
expenditure - especially controlling for the index of violence which is correlated to racial
fragmentation, but induces more taxes to ﬁnance additional police control.
6Indeed:
Wss = −3g2/s4 < 0,
Wgg = −θg−θ−1 (λ − as/4) − 1/s2 < 0
and
∆ ≡ WssWgg − W2
gs =
g2






































Notice that the optimal number of countries is increasing in the costs of het-
erogeneity a and decreasing in the absolute utility from the public good λ, while
both total and average expenditure are decreasing in this cost of heterogeneity
and increasing in the absolute utility from the public good. This results are in
contrast with the basic AS model where an increase in the costs of heterogeneity
were reducing the equilibrium size of countries but also increasing the per capita
public spending. Finally, the optimal number of nations maximizes per capita
provision of public goods, since s∗ =ˆ s and it is also increasing in the elasticity
of marginal utility of public expenditure θ: the less substitutable are the public
and the private goods (the higher θ) the more countries - and so more separate














We now switch to a decentralized world where public spending is chosen by
majority voting in each country and agents at a border between a country and
another can choose whether to live in one of the two or in autarchy (that is
without a public good). In equilibrium we require that no one wants to move
from a country to another or to move to autarchy. It is easy to verify that such
an equilibrium must be symmetric, that is with countries of equal size. To pin
down the set of equilibria we will also require stability. The crucial question will
be if the optimal solution derived earlier belongs to the set of stable equilibria.
In a country of size s, the favourite public expenditure by citizen i is:













7It is certainly true that to a certain extent also the degree of sustituibility between public
and private spending is endogenous. It would be interesting to study such an issue in a more
general model.
8which is clearly a decreasing function of the distance from the centre. Since
single peakedness holds,8 the median voter theorem implies the expenditure










which is the same as the optimal one for any country size since the median
citizen is the same as the average in each district. Now, expected utility for a



















































which is an inverted-U curve in the size of the country s. This function of s has
a unique peak which is decreasing in l. For a citizen at the border of a country
of size s,t h a ti sa td i s t a n c es/2 from the centre, utility is:
V (s/2) =
µ










An equilibrium requires that these agents are at least as well as under anar-
chy, that is V (s/2) ≥ y, which implies s ≤ (4λ/a)(1+θ)/(3+θ).9 Moreover, in a
stable symmetric equilibrium it must be that when two districts of diﬀerent size
share a border, citizens at the border of the bigger country prefer to migrate
to the smaller one, so as to re-equilibrate the symmetric outcome. In other
words, we require that utility is decreasing in size for the borderline citizens:






6 − 3θ − θ2












12 − 32θ +2 5 θ2 +2 θ3 − 3θ4
6 − θ − θ2
8To verify this notice that the distribution of preferences is uniform and symmetric on
t h er i g h ta n do nt h el e f to ft h ec e n t r e . H e n c et h e r ea r et w om e d i a nc i t i z e n sw i t hi d e n t i c a l
preferences, one on the right and one on the left of the centre.
9Notice that this constraint is not explicitly taken in consideration by AS where the exoge-
nous amount of public spending requires a ﬁxed and exogenous investment: implicitly they
assume that parameters are such that anarchy is never attractive.
9In other words, districts cannot be too small or too large in a stable equilib-
rium. It can be veriﬁed that the lower limit to the equilibrium size is decreasing
in θ and always below or equal to the optimal size, while the upper limit is
increasing in θ and below (above) the optimal size if θ < (>)1/3. For instance,









any stable equilibrium is characterized by suboptimal size of nations (as in AS).
This is always true for any θ ∈ [0,1/3) since in this case the upper bound on the
equilibrium size of nations is always below the optimal size. The suboptimal size
of nations is associated with suboptimal spending (both in total and average
terms). However, for higher enough θ the optimal geography can be a stable
equilibrium. Moreover, for θ > 1/3 there is the possibility of overoptimal size
of nations associated with overoptimal total government spending (the average
level is always suboptimal): indeed, when θ → 1w eh a v es∗ → 0 but a stable






Summarizing, the endogenous size of nations and governments is sub-optimal
when private and public spending are close substitutes and it may be over-
optimal when they are imperfect substitutes. Indeed in the XX century the
raise of public spending and the tendency toward an increase in the number of
nations started when governments where beginning to publically provide private
goods and services as those related to health, education and social security.
These public activities are associated with smaller scale economies and higher
heterogeneity of views and hence their spreading induced a tendency toward
break up of nations in smaller units.
Notice that the result for which the size of nations is sub-optimal when also
the size of their per capita public spending is sub-optimal and viceversa is not in
contradiction with the empirical result by Rodrik (1998) that larger governments
are associated with more open countries, which are also smaller, as emphasized
by Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). Indeed, according to this model there is a
10AS propose a diﬀerent stability condition which requires that, given two districts with a
border in common and sizes s and s−ε, the borderline citizen prefers to be in the smaller size
district for any small ε > 0 .I nt h es i m p l ec a s ew i t hθ = 0 this amounts to V [(s−ε)/2] ≥ V (s/2)
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⇔ λε(2s − ε) ≤
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which is a stricter condition than the one adopted in the text.
10general tendency toward too many countries with too small governments or too
few countries with too big governments, but in equilibrium all countries have
the same size. In the real world it may be that, despite the relationship found
by Rodrik (1998) and Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) across countries of diﬀerent
sizes, the average sizes of countries and governments are actually too small or
too big. When we will introduce openness in the next section we will actually
ﬁnd out that openness induces countries to become smaller but with a larger
public sector, exactly as the empirical evidence suggests.
In this perspective, the historical process of the last century toward smaller
size nations (witnessed by Alesina and Spolaore, 2003) may be seen as a con-
sequence of the increased sustituibility between private and public goods. One
may view publicly provided private goods as close substitutes with private goods
while pure public goods are less substitutable with private goods. It is a well
known fact that the diﬀusion of Communism around the world since the ﬁrst
half of the XXth century and the diﬀusion of the Welfare State in Western coun-
tries in the second half of the XXth century have extended government activity
toward publicly provided private goods as education, health and social security.
Since scale economies are much less powerful and heterogeneity of views is more
acute for these kind of activities than for the traditional public goods on which
the governments were focused until then, a tendency toward a decreasing size
of nations emerged during the last century.
Further limitations on the set of geographical equilibria could be obtained
putting more structure on the political way borders are changed. For instance
AS assume that a majority of all countries interested by a reshape of the borders
has to accept this change foreseeing the new associated political geography after
the change. It turns out that the associated equilibrium is unique and maximizes
the utility of the border line citizens. In our context this would correspond to
the lower bound of the set of stable equilibria: hence the AS conclusion that
equilibrium size is smaller than optimal always holds. An alternative reasonable
assumption one can make is that the size of a country can be reduced through
a secession of borderline citizens only if a majority agrees but that the capital
of the country which is breaking up remains where it was. Such a system avoids
the shift of capitals in all the countries associated with the AS system and
hence it may appear more reasonable (at least in certain historical periods). It
implies convergence toward the optimal size of countries for any θ > 1/3a n dt h e
maximum stable and suboptimal size otherwise.11 Hence the AS presumption
in favour of sub-optimal size of nations is again (weakly) conﬁrmed.
The previous results seem to suggest that the AS result of suboptimal size
11The proof is simple: consider a citizen at generic distance l from a public good. His or
her favourite size is s(l). As noted earlier, this is a decreasing function of the distance from
the centre. Hence single-peakedness holds in the referendum on enlargment or break-up and
when the median citizen favourite choice is a stable equilibrium (which happens for θ ≥ 1/3),
it is the unique equilibrium. Otherwise, the only equilibrium must be the largest size stable
equilibrium. Finally, notice that in this model the median citizen is also the average citizen.
11of nations is a quite robust result. In reality they point out a possible source of
failure of the AS result: whenever citizens closer to the centre have more power
than others in determining the policy, excessive spending and size of countries
emerge.12 One case where this emerges is when central governments are not
democratic and extract rents from the taxation of their citizens: Appendix I
shows an example and derives diﬀerent cases where the equilibrium size and
taxes can be suboptimal or above the optimal level. A sub-optimal number
of countries may emerge even in a democratic context as the one studied here
depending on the relationship between preferences and distance from the centre.
In this sense the assumption of linear costs of distance is quite crucial. In
Appendix II I study a version of the model with convex costs of heterogeneity
in the distance from the public good. In such a model the cost of distance for
the median citizen is lower than the average cost of distance (while they are
equal with linear costs of heterogeneity). Hence the AS result of suboptimal
districts may break up because the median citizen of each district votes for a
bigger size government than the one desired by the average citizen and opposes
to secessions which would limit the scale economies of their countries. Under
this circumstances it may be optimal to coordinate the design of borders so as
to limit the centralization bias.13 The Appendix shows how this can be done
by choosing a size of countries above the ﬁrst best level.
2.3 A Digression on Fiscal Federalism
Our model can be reinterpreted as a model of the organization of a country
in districts (or regions, or states), that is as a model of ﬁscal federalism. In
this section I brieﬂy comment on our results from this point of view and their
relationship with the literature.
The traditional theory of local public goods associated with Tiebout (1956)
ﬁnds the optimal solution to the provision of local public goods in a market
mechanism based on mobility of citizens between districts and local choice on
the provision of public goods. Such a decentralized system is able to sort citizens
with diﬀerent preferences and to allocate them in districts in which the right
amount of local public goods is provided. As Tiebout writes, “as the consumer
may be visualized as walking to a private market place to buy his goods, the
prices of which are set, we place him in a position of walking to a community
where the prices (taxes) of community services are set. Both trips take the
consumer to market. There is no way in which the consumer can avoid revealing
his preferences in a spatial economy. Spatial mobility provides the local public-
goods counterpart to the private market’s shopping trip”. The Tiebout model
12A related centralization bias emerging in international unions of countries is studied by
Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2001a).
13One may view a similar task in the geographical organization of modern colonies in states,
provinces and counties. Where history matters less, eﬃciency reasons are more likely to shape
the size of countries and districts within countries.
12has been formalized and extended to diﬀerent kinds of heterogeneity, to realistic
features of city environments in the spirit of urban economics and to precise
voting mechanisms at the district level in the spirit of political economy.14
A parallel literature well represented by Oates (1972, 1999), Gordon (1983)
and Brueckner (2000) has focused on the advantages of ﬁscal federalism as a
system of decentralized decision making on public expenditure ﬁnanced both
through local decentralized taxation and a net of intergovernmental taxes and
grants. In his classic book, Oates (1972) states a Decentralization Theorem for
which “in the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of a good
and of interjurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will always be at
least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-eﬃcient levels of consumption are
provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is
maintained across all jurisdictions”.15
If we abstract from spillovers between districts, the Tiebout model and the
Oates model together imply a strong presumption in favour of decentralization.16
A crucial assumption made by Tiebout in his analysis was that “communities
below the optimum size seek to attract new residents to lower average costs.
Those above optimum size do just the opposite. Those at the optimum try to
keep their populations constant”. Since this is just an assumption and we do
not see strong reasons why the sizes of districts should necessarily converge to
their optimum level, it seems important to investigate this issue. The issue is
also more important because districts of ineﬃcient size may also imply ineﬃ-
cient local public spending, undermining the all Tiebout argument. Is the size
of districts too big or too small? and is the local provision of public goods
eﬃcient? Our model has provided some tentative answers to these questions.
We found that in general the size of districts is not necessarily the opti-
mal one. Moreover, under reasonable conditions, and especially when public
spending is close substitute of private spending (which is most likely to be the
case at the local level), the size of districts tends to be suboptimal. However,
when citizens closer to the centre have more power than others in determining
the policy, excessive spending and size of countries emerge. This implies a new
presumption in favour of centralization at least in the shaping of districts (see
Appendix II on geographical coordination): more precisely, once a central gov-
ernment has decided the federal structure, each district can individually adopt
the optimal spending decision. This may partially counterbalance the advantage
14See Buchanan (1965), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Boadway and Flatters (1982), Fujita
(1989), Ellickson (1971), Brueckner (1979) and Epple and Romer (1991).
15More recently Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001), Besley and Coate (2003), Grad-
stein (2002a), Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2001b, 2003) and Etro and Giarda (2002),
have compared diﬀerent institutional organizations for a federation in a political economy
perspective.
16An important argument in favour of centralization is based on the possibility of tax
competition between districts, which may induce suboptimal taxation and hence suboptimal
public spending (Wildasin, 1989, Kanbur and Keen, 1993, Brueckner, 2000) or suboptimal
redistribution (Sørensen, 2003).
13of decentralization suggested by the traditional literature on ﬁscal federalism.
2.4 Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces
Recent history has been characterized, especially in Europe, by the co-existence
of centrifugal forces within nations (pressure towards regional autonomy in most
Western European countries and the break-up of some Eastern European na-
tions) and centripetal forces at a supranational level (the tendency to delegate
policies to supernational entities like the European Union). These two forces
may have a natural interconnection: the beneﬁts from participating in inter-
national unions may reduce the equilibrium size of nations. Separatism within
nations and delegation of policies to supernational entities could well be comple-
mentary parts of the same process. Such an hypothesis is suggested by Alesina,
Angeloni and Etro (2003). Here I borrow their simple characterization of in-
tercountry spillovers to provide a simple skecth of how this mechanism may
work.
Consider the basic model with λ =1a n dθ = 0 for simplicity. Imagine,
however, that there are spillovers across countries in their public spending. To
normalize the externality that public spending in each country exerts on the
other countries, assume that utility for of agent i in country j becomes:




where ¯ g−j is average public spending abroad and β ∈ [0,1] parametrizes the
size of spillovers across national public spendings.
It is standard to verify that the optimal geography would imply world coor-
dination to solve the problem:
max
g≥0,s ∈[0,1]






















which is increasing in the size of spillovers. In general, since ﬁscal policy is a
prosper-thy-neighbour policy, when interdependence across countries increases
it is optimal leave the size of countries unchanged and to increase public spending
in each country.
14In political equilibrium, however, a country of size s will choose public spend-
ing without internalizing the spillovers on the rest of the world. As before the













The favourite size by a citizen at distance l from the centre of its country
satisﬁes Vs(l) = 0, but since Vsβ(l) < 0 as it can be easily veriﬁed, it turns out
that the favourite size of countries by each citizen is decreasing in the size of
spillovers across national public spending. the obvious consequence is that when
interdependence across countries increases the equilibrium size of nations tends
to decrease and public spending decreases in each country.
Clearly, any group of country could be better oﬀ by joining in a union to co-
ordinate public spending and such a gain is increasing with the size of spillovers
β. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to model the formation of interna-
tional unions across countries (see Etro, 2002 and Alesina, Angeloni and Etro,
2001a,b, 2003), the bottom line of this simple extension is that when interde-
pendence across countries increases, there is a tendency toward increasing the
number of nations and creating supranational unions for policy coordination.
3 Endogenous Globalization
I will now investigate the consequences of globalization on the size of nations
and governments assuming that some externalities can be obtained from foreign
countries if a country is open, but their importance is reduced when a country
is already large (as many endogenous growth and trade models suggest).17 In
particular, output of country j is linear in the size of country j and linearly
r e l a t e dt ot h es i z eo ft h er e s to ft h ew o r l di np r o p o r t i o nt oi t sd e g r e eo fo p e n n e s s
ϕj ∈ [0,1]:
yj = hsj + hϕj(1 − sj) − f(ϕj) (13)
where h>0 parameterizes the size of the scale eﬀects and f(ϕ), with f(0) =
0, f0(ϕ) > 0, f00(ϕ) > 0 represents the costs of openness, which are usually
associated with the redistributive and political consequences of globalization.18
17See for instance Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
especially the discussion in Alesina and Spolaore (2003).
18F o ra nh i s t o r i c a lv i e wo nc o s t sa n db e n e ﬁts of globalisation see O’Rourke and Williamson
(1999). For related empirical evidence see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2002). Many economists
probably agree on the fact that the social cost of openness are only temporary and only the
positive net gains from trade remain in the long run. We may have introduced this assumption
in the dynamic version of the model but our qualitative results would have not changed.
15Notice that I am taking a short cut by assuming that what determines the
openness of country j is just the degree of protectionism chosen by the same
country j. Clearly in the real world also the choices of all the other countries
aﬀect the eﬀective openness of country j. This complication would imply an
interdependence between countries leading to well known bias toward excessive
protectionism. Such a limitation should be kept in mind in the evaluation of
t h ef u t u r er e s u l t s .
For simplicity let us focus on the case in which λ =1a n dθ = 0. The utility
of agent i in country j becomes:




which clearly corresponds to the case of the previous section when ϕ =1 ,t h a t
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Figure 2. The Eﬀects of Globalization
First, let us consider the optimal political geography for a given and common



















s3 + h(1 − ϕ) = 0 (14)
16As Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000) have emphasized, this implies that
the higher is the degree of openness the smaller is the optimal size of countries.

















which is increasing in the degree of openness: ψ∗
s(s,ϕ) > 0 under the regularity
condition that h is small enough, as we assume. Notice that ψ∗(0,ϕ)=0f o r
any ϕ and ψ∗
ss(s,ϕ) > 0 under weak conditions.









which is independent from the degree of openness.
Let us represent globalization as an increase in ϕ.F i g .2 c l e a r l y s h o w s
that globalization reduces the optimal size of nations s∗(ϕ). Moreover one can
show that the curve ψ∗(s,ϕ)a l w a y sc r o s s e st h ec u r v eφ∗(s) after its peak,19
hence it follows that globalization induces an increase in the optimal size of
public spending. This result has a crucial intuition: when market integration
increases for some exogenous reason, it becomes optimal to reduce the size
of countries so as to decrease heterogeneity within each country while enjoing
spillovers from the rest of the world. Such a process is associated with a greater
willingness to increase public spending because more homogeneous countries
gain more from their public good provision. Such a conclusion provides an
alternative explanation for the empirical ﬁnding of Rodrik (1998) who links the
correlation between openness and public spending with a greater need for risk
sharing and stabilizing activities. Our explanation supports the view of Alesina
and Waicziarg (1998) that the crucial channel to explain that correlation is the
size of countries: more open countries have larger governments because they are
smaller and hence more homogeneous.
3.1 Optimal Globalization
Imagine now that the degree of openness is also optimally chosen. Applying the
envelope theorem we can focus on the direct eﬀects on output. The optimality
condition implies:
h(1 − s)=f0(ϕ) (15)
Since dϕ/ds = −h/f00 < 0, this shows that smaller economies should be more
open, while large economies should be closer, and in general there is a negative
19This follows since ψ∗(s,1) > ψ∗(s,ϕ)f o ra n yϕ < 1 but ψ∗(s,1) crosses the curve φ∗(s)
at its peak.






which is another negatively sloped relationship between openness and size. The
two optimality relations s = s∗(ϕ)a n ds = S∗(ϕ)a r es h o w ni nF i g . 3i nt h e
space (ϕ,s). It can be shown that in case of more than one crossing, the one
with larger globalization is the global optimum.
As an example, let us consider the case in which f(ϕ)=hϕ2/2( a n dw e
need the regularity condition h ≤ 1/8 to avoid degenerate cases). This implies














s∗3 + hs∗ =0 ( 1 6 )
w h i c hi sa nS - s h a p e dc u r v ei ns∗, which cuts the x-axis ﬁrst from above and
then from below. Since at the optimum the second order condition requires





















Notice that the optimal size of countries is increasing in h and hence when the
scale eﬀects are more important. For the sake of simplicity let us also assume










which implies total spending at the level g∗ =6 4 /27a2.
3.2 Equilibrium Globalization
Let us switch to an equilibrium analysis. The natural assumption is that af-
ter countries are created with a certain provision of public goods which has
18been voted on, each country votes on the degree of openness.20 Under this as-
sumption, a given country of size s and spending g will choose its own level of
openness. The utility of the citizen at distance l from the centre is:






+ hs + hϕ(1 − s) − f(ϕ)
hence every citizen will agree on the optimal degree of openness which satisﬁes
h(1−s)=f0(ϕ), exactly as under optimality: this conﬁrms a well known prin-
ciple of trade theory: small economies prefer to be open, while large economies
prefer to be close. The negative relationship between size and openness can be
deﬁned as ϕ = ϕ(s)w i t hϕ0(s) < 0. Hence the indirect utility of the citizen at
distance l f r o mt h ec e n t r eb e c o m e s :






+ hs + hϕ(s)[1 − s] − f[ϕ(s)]
Again single-peakedness holds in the choice of public spending and, by the en-
velope theorem, it is not inﬂuenced by the choice on the degree of openness.
As previously shown one can derive equilibrium size s = se(ϕ)a n dg o v e r n m e n t
spending t = te(ϕ). Now an equilibrium size above the optimal level is certainly
associated with a sub-optimal size of governments, while the opposite is gener-
ally - but not always - true when equilibrium size is below the optimal level. In
the global equilibrium we must have:
ϕ = ϕ[se(ϕ)]
The equilibrium relationship ϕ = ϕ(s) can be inverted to obtain s = S∗(ϕ).
Graphically the two equilibrium relationships s = S∗(ϕ)a n ds = se(ϕ)c a n
b es h o w ni nt h es p a c e( ϕ,s). They are shown in Fig. 3 for a speciﬁc case
emphasizing the possibility of multiple equilibria. More importantly these equi-
libria are Pareto rankable: there can be equilibria with globalization backlash
a s s o c i a t e dw i t hl a r g en a t i o n sa n dh i g hp r o t e c t i o n i s ma n de q u i l i b r i aw i t hs m a l l e r
countries and high openness which are also Pareto superior. Notice that the
problem of excessive globalization derives from the externalities that the policy
of each country has on foreign countries and it could be limited adopting some
form of international policy coordination: in this case a commitment to increase
(limit) the degree of openness by each country would allow to achieve a Pareto
improvement over the equilibrium with globalization backlash (excessive glob-
alization) - see Alesina, Angeloni and Etro, 2003 on the endogenous creation of
international unions for policy coordination.
20T h es a m er e s u l t sw o u l de m e r g ei fc o u n t r i e sw e r ev o t i n gﬁrst on the degree of openness
a n dt h e no nt h ep r o v i s i o no fp u b l i cg o o d so re v e nc o n e t m p o r a n e o u s l y( s e q u e n t i a lv o t i n gi sn o t
strictly necessary to apply the median voter theorem since the prefered degree of openness is
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Figure 3. Endogenous Globalization and Multiple Equilibria
If we focus on the best equilibrium, which as we will see in the next section
is also the stable one, we can notice that the equilibrium relationship se(ϕ)
is shifted to the left compared to its optimal counterpart s∗(ϕ): this implies
that the best equilibrium is associated with excessive globalization and too small
countries, while public spending may be too much or too low.21 Notice that in
21The results would change if we assumed the opposite timing, that is countries initially
choosing their level of globalization foreseeing the geographical equilibrium which will follow.
Indirect utility of the citizen at distance l from the centre is:







+ hse + hϕ[1 − se(ϕ)] − f(ϕ)





Notice that se0(ϕ) < 0a n d
∂V (s/4)
∂s > 0 since for a given degree of openness, the equilibrium
size is suboptimal from the point of view of the average citizen, which is also the median one.
Hence, we have an extra cost from an increase in globalization due to the indirect reduction
20the case of complete globalization, the results of the previous section tell us that
public spending will be too small, hence one can conjecture that public spending
will be typically too much as long as the equilibrium level of globalization is not
too high.
Let us turn to the example with f(ϕ)=hϕ2/2. Given the political equilib-
rium degree of openness and public spending, the indirect utility of an agent at
distance l from the center becomes:































Stability of an equilibrium requires V (s/2) ≥ h/2a n dVs(s/2) ≤ 0. Let us focus
on the case in which h =1 /9. Since V (s/2) = s2 ¡
5/9 − as/2 − 3a2s2/32
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which does not include the optimal size of nations. Indeed, under our proposed
equilibrium concept, s∗ is too big and would induce a preference for anarchy
of citizens at the borders, and any equilibrium would imply suboptimal size
associated with too much public spending per capita if the equilibrium size is
not too small.
Despite the results of this example are not general, it emerges that typically
political equilibria tend to imply excessive globalization, too many countries and
too much government spending per capita.
3.3 Geopolitical Dynamics
Our ﬁnal enquiry is about the dynamic process bringing toward globalization.
Fig. 4 shows the dynamics of globalization and size of countries adopting a stan-
dard adjustment mechanism for the size of nations and the degree of openness.
In particular we assume the following dynamic system:
˙ s = β[se(ϕ) − s]
˙ ϕ = γ[Se(ϕ) − s]
where β > 0a n dγ > 0 are standard velocity of convergence parameters: When
the size of countries is below its equilibrium level for the current degree of
of the equilibrium size of the country. Anyway, multiple equilibria are again possible but we
cannot derive general welfare conclusions in this case since both the equilibrium relationships
are shifted to the left compared to their optimal counterparts (the only scenario we can exclude
is an equilibrium with too few countries and too much globalization).
21openness the size increases. When the degree of openness is below the optimal
level for a given size, that is the size of countries is below the level which is
consistent with the optimal degree of openness, the latter increases.
For expository purposes Fig. 4 focuses on a case with two steady state
equilibria. It emerges that in this case only one of the two equilibria is globally
stable, while the other can only be achieved along a saddle path. Focusing
on the ﬁrst one, starting from a condition of globalization backlash and large
countries, there are many paths of increasing number of countries and increasing
openness of countries which bring to the best steady state equilibrium. Clearly,
if there were more than two steady states, there may be poverty traps with
stable sub-optimal equilibria.
Such a diagram allows us to attempt a stilyzed reconstruction of world his-
t o r yb a s e do nt h et r a d e - o ﬀs emphasized in this paper. Imagine that the degree of
globalization is actually composed by an exogenous part, which largely depends
on technological progress and follows a stochastic trend. Its main component is
transportation costs, which have been declining over time with structural breaks
due to the introduction of new transportation methods, more powerful engines
and so on. Despite part of this technological progress may be endogenous, we
will neglect such a component. On the other side there is what we may call
the endogenous part of the degree of openness which depends on tariﬀ barriers,
quotas and other protectionist policies which are politically chosen.
As long as transportation costs were high enough, the degree of openness was
very low and the only possible equilibrium was one converging toward s =1 .I n
ancient time many Empires were universalistic in nature and tended to extend
their power over all the world which was known at the time: the Persian Empire,
Greece under Alexander Magnus or the Roman Empire were examples of such
a tendency. These periods were also characterized by a very limited role for
public spending.
It was only in the Low Medieval age that trasportation costs started to
sensibly decline and a revival of trade took place in the Mediterranean sea.
That was an age of free trade and it was characterized by a rapid reduction
in the size of countries whose peak was achieved when city-states like Venice,
Genoa, Lisbon, Antwerp and Amsterdam were dominating trade all over the
world.
During the XVII and XVIII centuries the equilibrium size of countries en-
larges and big kingdoms like France, Spain, England and Russia emerge. Mean-
while the size of their public spending, which is still focused on pure public goods
as defense, increases in absolute levels but remains quite low in per capita terms.
It is actually the necessity of a more eﬃcient and wider provision of the latter
to be one of the main causes of the evolution toward larger countries in Europe
(see Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). This period is also characterized by a smaller
degree of openness and the diﬀusion of merchantilistic theories, and also this
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Figure 4. Geopolitical Dynamics
A new era of globalization started with the Industrial Revolution in the
XIX century and, with the notable exceptions of two periods of globalization
blacklash after 1870 and in the interwar period, globalization proceeded until
today (see O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999). The number of periods increased
quite rapidly in this period and the size of public sectors rapidly expanded.
Our model is consistent with such a pattern since it implies that the process
of reduction in the size of countries would be associated with at least an initial
increase in the size of public spending. Only at a later stage there may be a
decline (along the inverted U curve which relates equilibrium public spending
and the size of nations). One can see the initial increase in public spending
in the raise of Communism in Eastern countries and in the raise of the welfare
state in Western countries. A process of reduction in public spending associated
with globalization is underway since the failure of Communism in most Eastern
countries and the recent tendency toward the reduction of the public sector in
Western countries. A possible prediction of our model is a further reduction of
public spending in countries which are opening up to world markets.
234 Conclusion
We have studied optimal and equilibrium political geography in a simple model
where size of countries, public spending by their governments and globalization
are endogenous. The optimal geography may not be a stable equilibrium and the
Alesina-Spolaore bias toward too many nations tends to be conﬁrmed. However,
multiple equilibria can emerge with globalization backlash associated with large
nations and high protectionism and equilibria with smaller countries and high
openness which are also Pareto superior. A dynamic version of the model shows
stable paths of decreasing size of nations, increasing globalization and (at least
initially) increasing public spending. Such a process seems consistent with the
hystorical experience, but it may converge toward a steady state with excessive
globalization, too many countries and typically too much government spending.
The analysis can be extended microfounding the dynamic model with a more
accurate description of the intertemporal links leading to break up of nations
and change of policies and introducing geopolitical risk to study how this aﬀects
the equilibrium geography (on wars and democracy see Alesina and Spolaore,
1996 and Hess and Orphanides, 2001).
Finally it would be interesting to integrate the theory of political geography
and the theory of economic geography. On the latter, recent important progress
has been made by the pathbreaking contribution of Krugman (1991) who has
been able to describe phenomena of industrial and urban location, regional
specialization and international trade (see also Fujita, Krugman and Venables,
1999). Spatial heterogeneity, density population and scale economies are crucial
there as here, but the interdependence between political and economic choices
and political and economic geography still remains to be studied.
Appendix I: A world of Leviathans
Following AS I also solve for the equilibrium in the case central governments
are dictatorial and extract rents from their countries. Let us assume for simplic-
ity θ =0a n dλ = 1. Imagine that to avoid coups, dictators have to provide the
same utility as under anarchy to a fraction δ of the population. They coopera-
tively choose their policies to maximize total rents. Since the size of countries
s implies that there are 1/s countries and each one creates rents ts − g when
per capita taxes are t and public spending is g, the problem of the Leviathans
becomes:
max




























and the rents 1/4a2δ2 per country. It follows that if the dictatorships are strong
enough (δ < 1/2) the size of countries and their per capita taxation are greater
than in the optimal geography, but total public spending is still smaller than in
the optimal geography as long as δ < 1/2
√
2.
Appendix II: Centralization bias
Let us assume quadratic costs of heterogeneity in the distance from the
public good, and for simplicity let us assume θ = 0 and λ = 1. Utility for agent
i in district j is now:

















di s.v.: stj = gj

















































which gives us a ﬁrst relationship between optimal size of districts and the






25Moreover, the Samuelson rule for optimal public good provision gives us a func-


















w h i c hi sa ni n v e r t e dUc u r v ew i t hap e a ka ts = 2 √
a. Solving the system of the














one with a per capita public expenditure t∗ = 4
3
√
a and total provision of the
public good g∗ = 8
3a.
Let us now consider a decentralized equilibrium. In a district of size s,t h e
favorite public expenditure by citizen i is:






which is clearly a decreasing function of the distance from the center. Since
single peakedness holds, the median voter theorem implies expenditure:







which is above the optimal one for any district size because of the fact that the
cost of distance for the median citizen is lower than the average cost of distance
(they were equal with linear costs of heterogeneity). The important positive
implication is that the political equilibrium per capita expenditure should be:




which is a monotonic function increasing in size for small districts and decreasing
for big districts. Now expected utility for a citizen at distance l from the public
good in a district of size s is:
































which is maximized by the size s =4 /
√




To limit the ineﬃciency of equilibria, one can imagine a form of geographical
coordination. Let us consider a system in which the social planner can choose
the geographical organization in districts but each district decides autonomously
its public good provision. This would be the result of an eﬃcient process of
borders creation. In the latter stage, we know that utility in a district of size







































This second best has a straightforward intuition. Since districts tend to overpro-
vide public goods, the central authority can improve the allocation of resources
by ﬁxing borders in such a way to have larger size of districts than in the ﬁrst
best so as to increase the scale economies. The best size is however smaller
than the favourite size of the median citizen to limit the bias toward excessive
provision.
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